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Introduction
Intrapreneurship -also known as corporate entrepreneurship and corporate venturing (Burgelman 1983; Burgelman 1984; MacMillan et. al. 1986 ) -is the practice of developing a new venture within an existing organization, to exploit a new opportunity and create economic value (Pinchot 1985) . Entrepreneurship by contrast is the act of developing a new venture outside an existing organization. There is evidence that intrapreneurship helps managers to renew and revitalize their businesses, to innovate, and to enhance their overall business performance (Kuratko et. al. 1990; Antoncic and Hisrich 1990) . It is therefore of interest to investigate which factors are associated with e¤orts to start new ventures for an employer by 'nascent intrapreneurs', and which are associated instead with independent start-ups by 'nascent entrepreneurs' -where the word 'nascent' refers to emergent (i.e.
, not yet completed) start-up activity. The present article explores this question.
Previous research has identi…ed several reasons why new opportunities might be exploited via entrepreneurship rather than intrapreneurship. These include agency costs which a¤ect contracting between employees and employers; transferable human capital and limited asset complementarity within existing …rms; and organizational limitations of incumbents such as bureaucracy and rigid routines (Henderson 1993; Anton and Yao 1995; Klepper 2001; Helfat and Lieberman 2002) . However, to date there is only limited empirical evidence about the factors promoting entrepreneurship rather than intrapreneurship. Instead, the evidence base is mainly concerned with: linking the market entry strategies and performance outcomes of new spino¤s to the performance of parent …rms (Christensen 1993; Helfat and Lieberman 2002; Gompers et. al. 2005; Klepper and Thompson 2006) ; organizational factors which in ‡uence intrapreneurship (Pinchot 1985; Hornsby et. al. 2002) ; the e¤ects of intrapreneurship on corporate performance (Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Zahra and Gravis 2000) ; and characteristics of intrapreneurs (Fayolle 2004; Howell and Higgins 1990a) .
This article develops theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the factors promoting nascent intrapreneurship relative to nascent entrepreneurship. These arguments principally draw on contributions from human capital theory and incentive (agency) theory. The article utilizes data from a relatively large and representative publicly-available survey of American adults, the PSED II (www.psed.isr.umich.edu). This dataset makes a clean distinction between NE and NI startups, and contains a rich array of explanatory variables about individuals and their products; the processes they follow; and the organizational environments they operate in, including information about their current or former employers (Aldrich 1999; Menzel et. al. 2007 ). The PSED II also contains information about people who choose neither intrapreneurship nor entrepreneurship. This makes it possible to deal with the possibility that nascent intrapreneurs and entrepreneurs self-select non-randomly into these activities.
Dealing with sample selection turns out to be crucial for deriving accurate empirical results. The …ndings reveal a central role for general human capital, which promotes start-up organizing e¤orts in general, and nascent entrepreneurship (rather than nascent intrapreneurship) in particular. While previous research has already identi…ed general human capital as an important determinant of start-up e¤orts in general (e.g. Davidsson and Honig 2003) , its in ‡uence on NE relative to NI is less well known. Furthermore, it is found that independent starts are more likely to exploit ideas which involve talking to customers rather than researching established competitors, and which leverage social ties as well as general human capital. In contrast, incumbent …rms tend to pursue intrapreneurship by developing unique business-to-business products which seem to be harder for employees to transfer into independent start-up e¤orts.
We believe that these results are not only interesting in their own right but also could prove informative for theory and practice. For example, because the (observable) characteristics of individuals, their current or more recent workplaces, and their proposed new products all turn out to a¤ect the decision to do NI or NE, future theories might need to be enriched to draw on a broader range of considerations than has been the case hitherto. In particular, our …ndings suggest the need for future theory to extend the scope of inquiry from that of the individual employee to take greater account of the objectives, capabilities and limitations of the organizations they work for. Strategic interactions between agents in this context are likely to be both interesting and wide-ranging.
Future theory development might also fruitfully delve deeper into the self-selection mechanisms (based on unobservable characteristics) which our empirical investigation uncovers. 4 The next section develops theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the factors promoting NI relative to NE. The section that follows it explains the dataset, including key explanatory variables and control variables. The …fth section outlines the empirical methods used to test the hypotheses. The sixth section presents the results. The …nal section concludes.
Theory
A large body of theoretical research emphasizes the importance of human capital for understanding the determinants of start-up organizing e¤orts. It is convenient at the outset to follow Becker (1964) by distinguishing between 'general'and 'speci…c'human capital. General human capital comprises skills, knowledge, experience and capabilities (such as those embodied in formal education) which are useful in a multitude of productive uses, including both existing organizations and new venture creation. Speci…c human capital in contrast refers to skills, experience, knowledge and capabilities, such as those imparted by …rm-speci…c training programs, which are primarily useful to the organization which provides them.
The distinction between general and speci…c human capital helps to elucidate implications of an agency problem studied by Anton and Yao (1995) , in which an employee identi…es a new venture opportunity which can be exploited either inside or outside the …rm. The employee can keep the opportunity secret, and quit the …rm in order to exploit it in a new independent …rm (NE); or she can disclose it to the …rm in the hope of sharing in the pro…ts resulting from joint development (NI). The greater an employee's general human capital, the greater is their capability to exploit the opportunity outside the …rm in independent NE (Zucker et. al. 1998) . General human capital is associated with analytical ability, knowledge about business opportunities and conditions, and computational and communication skills which are readily transferable between organizations. In contrast, an employee's general human capital may be less relevant for developing the opportunity via NI if the …rm can substitute other workers'general human capital to develop the idea once it has been revealed to them. Hence one might expect general human capital to be more associated with NE than with NI activity.
The value of new venture opportunities discovered within …rms is frequently enhanced by complementarities with other assets speci…c to the …rm (Teece 1986; Subramanian 2005) . For example, an employee's speci…c human capital can a¤ect the development trajectory of a new idea, culminating in an innovation which is complementary to the internal organization of the …rm and hence more valuable if exploited within it. In such cases, intrapreneurship would appear to be a logical option.
But although speci…c human capital might be di¢ cult to transfer outside incumbent …rms owing to formal barriers (e.g. non-compete agreements) and informal barriers (e.g. embedded organizational skills), it is less obvious which aspects of speci…c human capital are truly speci…c to the …rms they are acquired in. Indeed, several theories of independent spino¤s argue that 'speci…c'human capital is actually more transferable outside the …rm than it …rst appears (Helfat and Lieberman 2002; Møen 2005) .
Consider, for example, knowledge about a …rm's internal organizational routines, which is an important kind of speci…c human capital (Nelson and Winter 1982; Klepper 2001) . Although this knowledge might be redundant in other incumbent …rms, employees leaving a …rm to start a new independent venture might be able to replicate and transfer these routines to the new venture to better exploit their opportunities (Klepper 2001; Freeman and Engel 2007) . In which case, what appears to be speci…c human capital might actually promote NE as well as NI activity, having more ambiguous e¤ects on choices of commercialization mode than general human capital does.
These ideas are summarized in the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. General human capital makes NE more attractive relative to NI, and has stronger e¤ ects on the mode of commercialization than speci…c human capital.
Other …rm-speci…c assets include established marketing, sales, design and logistics departments, which are set up to service a …rm's existing operations but which can also work with a new internal product line. The existence of these assets; a reputation for providing a stable and trusted source of supply; and greater legitimacy relative to new independent start-ups, give incumbent …rms an advantage over new independent ventures in commercializing new opportunities, whether of 6 the business-to-business (B2B) or business-to customer (B2C) sort. However, it seems likely that incumbent …rms have a comparative advantage over new ventures in B2B rather than B2C sales (Claycomb et. al. 2005 ). The reasoning is as follows. Few independent start-ups have access to the resources needed to supply other businesses (especially legitimacy and reputation), and instead are likely to have a comparative advantage in forging B2C relationships whose e¤ectiveness depends on ‡exible adjustment to fast-changing consumer demand. In these circumstances, incumbents' routines can be a positive disadvantage, since redeploying resources from their current uses can cause ine¢ ciencies as managers of incumbent …rms strive to retain those resources to support the projects for which they are responsible. This can allow independent entrepreneurship to exploit pro…table (though possibly short-lived) niches (Audretsch and Thurik 2001; Freeman and Engel 2007) .
Hypothesis 2. Business-to-business opportunities are associated more with NI than NE commercialization: business-to-customer opportunities are associated more with NE than NI. Anton and Yao (1995) argue that greater personal wealth enables an employee to contract more e¤ectively with their employer. Anton and Yao (1995) consider a contract under which, in return for posting a bond to the employer, an employee who chooses joint commercialization is guaranteed a stake of the pro…ts. This contract removes the risk of expropriation by the employer and makes the employee willing to reveal their discovery -so promoting NI commercialization. In contrast, employees lacking wealth cannot post a bond. Being exposed to the threat of expropriation, they are likelier to take their opportunity outside the …rm, via the NE route. Hence wealth may be necessary for NI exploitation.
A di¤erent argument proposes a positive relationship between available income and the probability of the NI mode. Managers wishing to discourage employees from quitting to found potentially competing start-ups might seek to 'buy them o¤' with higher salaries, which helps retain both the employee and the innovation within the …rm (Møen 2005; Subramanian 2005; Hvide and Kristiansen 2007; Hvide 2009 ). More generally, it has been argued that even when employers lack complementary assets and property rights, they can still design compensation contracts which successfully retain employees with valuable new ideas within the …rm (Pakes and Nitzan 1983; Anton and Yao 1994; Møen 2005) . For these reasons, I propose the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Greater personal wealth and income make NI more attractive relative to NE.
The types of products commercialized by new start-ups are also likely to di¤er between NE and NI modes. Large …rms can spread the risks of innovation, giving them greater incentives to engage in the risky activity of radical innovation. They also perform more R & D (Cohen and Klepper 1992) , which is often needed to pioneer new innovations. Both of these arguments suggest that NI is associated with unique products. Incumbents also have greater incentives to innovate in order to retain monopoly pro…ts than new independent entrants, since the latter can at best obtain duopoly pro…ts by competing with incumbents (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) . Furthermore, an incumbent is more likely to support a corporate venture innovating a unique new product which does not compete with (i.e. cannibalize the pro…ts from) the incumbent's existing product line. And a new product presumably has to be su¢ ciently di¤erent from a …rm's existing product line in order for it to be commercialized as a new business unit (NI) rather than via simply internal expansion.
Another set of incentives is pertinent for managers who try to motivate their employees to work on a main task. Managers can often do best by committing to a policy of passing up mundane innovations discovered by employees to keep them focused on their main task; it only pays managers to break this policy rule and back NI when unique, valuable projects emerge (Hellmann 2007 ).
On the other hand, unique new products can create their own problems for corporations. They can disrupt valuable organizational routines which work smoothly and e¤ectively for the …rm's existing product lines. And they can threaten to render obsolete the expertise underlying the careers of managers responsible for deciding the innovation strategy of the …rm. As a result, managers may prefer to back relatively predictable incremental innovations rather than ambitious radical ones (Bhide 2000; Freeman and Engel 2007) . Furthermore, uncertainty associated with unique new products can promote divergent opinions between employees and employers about the value 8 of a discovery. That makes it less likely that both parties will agree on initiating a corporate venture (Audretsch 2001; Klepper and Sleeper 2005) . Hence managers wishing to encourage NI may need to obtain objective information to convince sceptics within their organizations about a new corporate venturing opportunity, especially if it is based around a unique new product. In particular, managers may need to acquire information about competitors who might also be working on similar developments. With this information in place, incumbent …rms should be more willing to adjust routines and resolve internal con ‡icts to facilitate intrapreneurship. Hence we might expect research about competitors to promote NI commercialization directly, as well as to moderate positively the relationship between the uniqueness of a venture's product and the likelihood of NI commercialization. These arguments are summarized in the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Products or services with unique attributes are more likely to be developed via NI than NE. NI exploitation of these opportunities entails research about competitors, which both promotes NI commercialization directly and moderates positively the relationship between the uniqueness of a venture's product and the likelihood of NI commercialization.
Entrepreneurship researchers have established that people who are engaged in start-up activities, whether NE or NI, are not representative of the population but are instead a self-selected group, amounting to no more than 6% of the American adult population . If these self-selected individuals have unobserved attributes which predispose them to a particular mode of entry, then it is important to take this into account when analyzing empirically NI-NE outcomes. For example, consider two hypothetical individuals, A and B, where A has unobserved attributes which predispose them to entrepreneurial-type work over corporate wage-and-salary work, unlike B who prefers the corporate environment. It seems plausible given these preferences that B is more likely (all else equal) to engage in NI if they try a start-up at all.
In contrast, independence-seeking A is more likely (all else equal) to engage in NE if they try a start-up at all.
Hypothesis 5. Individuals engaged in new …rm founding e¤ orts are a self-selected group. Unobserved attributes that predispose individuals to work on a start-up in general rather than work in a corporate environment also predispose them to prefer NE to NI.
To date, the empirical literature on nascent entrepreneurship Davidsson 2006 ) has placed greater emphasis on observable characteristics that may be associated with a propensity to engage in some form of start-up activity, whether NE or NI. The underlying rationale rests in part on human capital theory and opportunity cost logic (Davidsson 2006) . For example, if general human capital is more (respectively, less) valuable in new business venturing (whether NE or NI) than in traditional corporate employment, then highly educated and experienced people are more (respectively, less) likely to engage in new venturing activity. The US evidence is broadly consistent with this prediction (Davidsson 2006; Kim et. al. 2006) .
Another important aspect of general human capital is age, since human capital theory suggests that individuals who are neither too young nor too old are most likely to engage in business startups, all else equal (Lévesque and Minniti 2006) . People of an intermediate age have not only acquired enough human, social and …nancial capital to have reasonable prospects of launching a successful new venture, but also anticipate a su¢ ciently prolonged stream of returns from their investment to make it worthwhile. Previous evidence on nascent entrepreneurs has borne out this conjecture as well (Delmar and Davidsson 2000; Davidsson 2006 ). These arguments are summarized in the …nal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. General human capital makes start-up organizing activities, whether NE or NI, more attractive relative to non-start-up organizing activities.
Data
The discussion in the previous section highlights the need for a dataset which contains information relating to two questions. These are: factors a¤ecting selection into any kind of start-up organizing activity; and factors a¤ecting NI relative to NE for the self-selected group of individuals choos- The most widely used de…nition of a nascent entrepreneur in empirical research is somebody who satis…es all four of the following criteria: 1) they consider themselves to be involved in the …rm creation process, 2) they have engaged in some start-up activity in the past 12 months, 3) they expect to own all or part of the new …rm, and 4) their initiative has not progressed to the point where it may be considered an operating business. For consistency, nascent intrapreneurs are classi…ed in a similar way but report that they are engaged in start-up activities for their employer, as part of their normal work. This de…nition is consistent with the de…nition of intrapreneurship given at the start of this article, namely of developing a new venture within an existing organization (Pinchot 1985) . These de…nitions yield two distinct and non-overlapping groups of NIs and NEs.
For completeness, I also explored two alternative de…nitions of NI and NE status in the PSED II, based on 'type of business' and 'business ownership'. However, neither of these alternatives turned out to be satisfactory. The 'type of business'variable contains a category 'new businesses sponsored by an existing business'. Unfortunately, it is unclear what 'sponsorship' means in this context, as the majority of these 'sponsored' businesses do not cede any ownership stake to any other stakeholder, including a sponsoring business. Nor does the PSED II contain enough information to operationalize an alternative de…nition based on employer ownership shares alone. Perhaps even more fundamentally, however, neither 'sponsorship'nor 'ownership'is a necessary or su¢ cient condition for intrapreneurship. Numerous intrapreneurial ventures are operated on an 'arms length' and self-sustaining basis, obviating the need for overt sponsorship; while some intrapreneurial ventures can involve family business owners 'gifting' new business opportunities to their friends or relatives without taking an ownership stake.
Based on the chosen de…nitions of NI and NE described above, of the 1,214 people engaged in start-up activities at the time of interview, 269 cases were classi…ed as nascent intrapreneurs, NI, and the remaining 945 were classi…ed as nascent entrepreneurs, NE. This yields two binary dependent variables: whether an individual engages in start-up activity or not, and if so whether they do as a NI or a NE.
The sample was restricted to exclude retired people. By de…nition, retirees cannot be genuine nascent intrapreneurs because they do not have a current employer. This reduced the sample size from 31; 845 to 22; 741 observations. The sample was not restricted in any further respect, and contains members of both genders operating across a range of industries and various ethnicities.
Every calculation performed in this article reweights the sample data using the screener interview weights provided with the dataset. These weights correct for di¤erences in sample inclusion probabilities and di¤erential non-response rates. Data on sex, age, household income and race taken from the March 2005 Current Population Survey conducted by the US Census Bureau were used to construct the weights. The use of these weights ensures that the data are representative of the US population, enabling the researcher to make robust and generalizable inferences.
Whether to try a start-up: Screener variables
The Screener dataset contains several general human capital variables corresponding to those outlined in Hypotheses 1 and 6. They include the highest educational quali…cations achieved, namely High School, Some College, College Degree, and Postgraduate. These are coded as dummy variables; the base category is 'less than high school'. Several age categories are also coded as dummy variables, notably Age 18-24, Age 25-34, Age 35-44 and Age 45-54. The base category is '55 and over'.
In terms of general non-formal skills, the Screener contains information about whether respondents use the Internet at home. The variable Internet is coded as one if they do, and zero otherwise. The 12 use of this variable is also consistent with previous research. For example, using matched CPS and Computer and Internet Usage data from 1997 , Fairlie (2006 showed that computer usage is associated with a higher probability that American adults become business owners, not only in the IT sector but across a range of industries.
Previous research has also identi…ed several other determinants of start-up activity, which can be treated as control variables in the present context. These include family circumstances, sociodemographic factors and regional characteristics (Davidsson 2006) . The Screener records whether an individual is a Household Head (not necessarily male), Married, Works Full-time, and is an Owner Occupier. Household heads are most likely to engage in some form of economic activity, so this variable controls for the labor force participation decision. Full-time, married owner-occupiers are especially likely to have domestic responsibilities which deter them from engaging in risky start-up activities: this theme is elaborated on below in the empirical discussion of the model identi…cation strategy. The following control variables are also included: a dummy for Female gender; a dummy for whether the individual is responsible for Young Children (aged under six years); and a continuous variable measuring Household Size. These factors have all been emphasized in previous work (Edwards and Field-Hendrey 2002) . Participation in start-ups is also known to vary by ethnicity (Kim et. al. 2006) , so dummies for African-American and Latino heritage are added as well (there were insu¢ cient cases to analyze separately Asian-Americans). Also drawing on previous research in nascent entrepreneurship, dummy variables for broad geographical regions and whether the location of the start-up is Urban are included to control for regional variations in opportunities Wagner and Sternberg 2004) .
Whether to do a start-up by NI or NE: Follow-up variables
The Follow-up dataset contains information about the current workplace (for those trying to start up while in paid-employment) or the most recent workplace (for those trying to start up after quitting a previous spell of paid-employment). Speci…c human capital (Hypothesis 1) is notoriously di¢ cult to measure directly; but it seems plausible that the longer a respondent has worked for their most recent employer, the greater their exposure to that organization and the greater their chances of acquiring speci…c human capital. Furthermore, managers, especially those who supervise numerous employees seem especially likely to have broad …rm-speci…c knowledge, including familiarity with organizational routines, which as suggested earlier can facilitate corporate venturing (and possibly also independent venturing if routines can be replicated outside the …rm). I therefore measure speci…c human capital using continuous variables for Job Tenure (measured in log years) and the No. of Supervisees in the current or previous job; and also by a dummy variable for being a Manager in the current or previous job.
Turning to Hypothesis 2, respondents in the Follow-up survey report the percentage of their sales projected to come from Business-to-Business sales (B2B Sales). One concern with using this variable is that it might be tautologically related to nascent intrapreneurship if parent …rms expect there to be major B2B collaborations in future between themselves and the intrapreneurial venture.
If so, NI ventures would have incentives to locate close to parent …rms. To check this possibility, I examined data on the percentage of new ventures'customers expected to be located within twenty miles of the new venture in the …rst two to three years after start-up. If the variable B2B Sales merely re ‡ects collaborations with the parent …rm, responses for NIs to this question should be signi…cantly higher than for NEs. In fact, the …gure was only 59.1% for NIs, compared with 61.1% for NEs. This di¤erence, which is statistically insigni…cant, suggests that B2B Sales is capturing more than tautological linkages between nascent intrapreneurship and future collaboration opportunities.
Cardinal data on the natural logarithm of household income Log Income and net household wealth Wealth (measured in millions of US dollars, and taking negative as well as positive values) are used to test Hypothesis 3. To test Hypothesis 4, respondents who declared that some or all of their potential customers would regard the new product as 'new and unfamiliar'had values of the variable Unique Product coded as unity; those which did not had zero values. Another dummy variable registers whether market research on competitors was performed (Competitor Information).
The interaction between these variables is denoted by Unique
Competitor.
The Follow-up dataset also contains an extensive range of control variables relating to: industry sector; the nature of the product, its intended market and market research; and the workplace of the current or most recent employer. By controlling for these other factors, cleaner tests of the hypotheses of interest can be performed. Product and Market The corporate venturing literature focuses largely on high-tech and newtech products (Menzel et. al. 2007) . It is desirable to control for these product types to ensure that choices for NI relative to NE are not simply being driven by di¤erences in the nature of the products being developed. Dummy variables classifying whether the product being developed in the start-up e¤ort is High Tech or New Tech are used to control for product type, where new-tech products are those requiring technologies or procedures which were generally unavailable more than …ve years ago.
Industry Sector
Other potentially relevant product characteristics include whether the new venture will compete on Quality (as opposed to price); whether it will embody Proprietory Technology (the base category is that it does) or is Protected by a Patent (the base category is that it is); and whether Equipment was Purchased already. The literature does not o¤er unambiguous theoretical predictions about whether greater intellectual property rights generally favor NI or NE. The outcome partly depends which party who owns the IPR and the value of the innovation relative to a …rm's existing product lines (Hellmann 2007; Hvide and Kristiansen 2007) .
Previous research has identi…ed the clear framing of business opportunities and business planning to exploit them as potentially important aspects of start-up planning and execution (Delmar and Shane 2004) . To control for the possibility that di¤erent modes of commercialization are associated with di¤erent types of business planning, I include dummy variables for whether the Opportunity was De…ned at the outset; whether a Current Business Plan had been begun; whether a Future Business Plan was projected; and whether the entrepreneur(s) had already Talked to Customers.
There are also continuous variables measuring the percentages of projected sales intended for Government Sales, and the percentage of the product's market targeted at a Regional Market or the National/International Market. The rationale for including these control variables is once again to ensure that choices for NI relative to NE are not simply being driven by di¤erences in the nature of the products being developed.
Current or Most Recent Workplace Characteristics of the current or most recent workplace might determine opportunities to do corporate venturing. These opportunities could be more abundant in Private Growth …rms than in Private Static …rms (both measured as dummy variables).
Size e¤ects are controlled for by Employer Size, measured as the logarithm of the number of people on the payroll at the most recent workplace. To capture possible gender di¤erences transmitted within current or previous workplaces, two other dummy variables record whether the workplace was Male Dominated or Female Dominated, as opposed to neither.
Finally, prior research suggests that NI projects are more likely to ‡ourish if they receive support from 'champions'inside the …rm, such as senior managers (Howell and Higgins 1990a; Howell and Higgins 1990b) . Such support can be harder to obtain in companies with large bureaucracies, especially where there is a long line of control 'distance' between the potential entrepreneur and the CEO. To control for this possibility, the variable Distance to CEO measures the logarithm of the number of employees intervening between the respondent and the CEO. The greater the distance, the more di¢ cult it could be to gain support from senior managers. However, values of this variable (and also of Employer Size) are estimated by respondents and so may be prone to mis-measurement. Any systematic under-or over-reporting, by some scale factor k, will be partialed out into the intercept (since log(kx) = log k + log x); but any remaining non-systematic (random) errors mean that results based on these variables should be interpreted with caution. of survey respondents are engaged in some start-up activity, similar to previous estimates for the US economy 
Estimation Methodology
My goal is to explain the determinants of engagement in start-up activity, and of nascent intrapre- The fact that X variables a¤ect only S, while Z variables a¤ect only I, re ‡ects the structure of the PSED II dataset. As explained at the start of the next section, this structure can be used to identify the sample-selection model, which is a two-equation bivariate probit (BVP):
(1)
where cov( 1i ; 2i ) = = 1 1 :
Following standard practice (e.g., Greene 2003), the disturbances 1 and 2 are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, with zero means, unit variances, and correlation coe¢ cient . Non-zero values of capture any sample selectivity in the nascent intrapreneur/entrepreneur choice. A positive value for implies that unobserved characteristics which predispose individuals to engage in startup activities also predispose them to NI. A negative value implies that a start-up predisposition is associated with NE. Recall that Hypothesis 5 predicts to be negative.
Estimation of the parameters in (1), (2) and (3) is performed by the method of Full Information
Maximum Likelihood (FIML). FIML is the most e¢ cient estimator because it exploits all of the data structure. It estimates simultaneously the s, s and by maximizing the log likelihood (Greene 2003) , where
are the distribution functions of the standard normal and bivariate normal distributions, respectively. All estimations were performed using LIMDEP 8.0. No problems of collinearity were identi…ed by the estimation procedure.
Results
This section has the following structure. The …rst part deals with the identi…cation of the model.
The second estimates a simple version of the BVP model (1)-(3) using just the Screener data. This enables Hypotheses 1, 5 and 6 to be tested. I also demonstrate here the biases that can occur if the sample-selection issue is neglected. Third, Follow-up data are utilized to test the remaining hypotheses. Finally, several robustness checks are performed.
Identi…cation
The model given by (1), (2) and (3) is identi…ed by specifying some X variables which a¤ect S but not I. This entails imposing one or more exclusion restrictions on the I equation. I will …rst
give a theoretical rationale for the exclusion restrictions that are adopted, before discussing their empirical validity.
My identi…cation strategy utilizes the following six household status variables: being a household head; being married; working full-time; being an owner-occupier; having young children in the household; and living in a large household. These variables are associated with an individual's responsibility for the welfare of their household. It can be argued that these responsibilities reduce individuals'appetite for risky and time-consuming work options which could damage their ability to discharge their responsibilities e¤ectively. That in turn is likely to reduce the attractiveness of starting up a venture, which is associated with high levels of risk, and which often entails heavy time commitments. Of course, it is also possible that some factors, like marriage and household size could be associated with access to greater resources which actually promote start-up activities;
but the key point is that household status variables are likely to a¤ect the probability of doing any kind of start-up relative to paid-employment. In contrast, they are not obviously associated with choices between the NI and NE modes of start-up conditional on start-up activities being chosen, since both NE and NI can be expected to entail risk and heavy time commitments.
Buttressing these arguments, previous research has emphasized the similarity of intrapreneurs and entrepreneurs in terms of personality traits and personal circumstances. It has recently been noted, for example, that "Intrapreneurs can be de…ned as entrepreneurs within existing organizations, and they closely resemble independent entrepreneurs : : : Unfortunately, no clear-cut pro…le is available that could help to identify intrapreneurs : : : many of them do share similar personality traits : : :
anyone who behaves with entrepreneurial spirit within an existing organization --at any level and in any function --can be an intrapreneur" (Menzel et al, 2007, p.734-35) . This suggests that we are justi…ed in excluding the six household status variables from the I equation while retaining them in the S equation.
The identi…cation strategy was implemented in the following way. First, one of the six household status variables was chosen to just identify the model (it turned out not to matter which was chosen:
see on). The …ve remaining variables were then included in (1) but excluded from (2). Second, these over-identifying restrictions were tested using a likelihood ratio test. So, for example, using
Household Head as the identifying variable, the null hypothesis of acceptable exclusion restrictions was not rejected: 2 (5) = 2:34. At the same time, the …ve remaining variables were individually and jointly signi…cant determinants of S (see Table 2 for parameter estimates and standard errors).
Replacing Household Head with each of the other …ve variables as the identifying variable gave 2 (5) likelihood ratio statistics ranging between 2:27 and 3:38: none of these are anywhere close to conventional levels of statistical signi…cance either. I therefore proceed by imposing these identifying and over-identifying restrictions hereafter.
Results based on screener data
The …rst set of results appear in Table 2 . These are the coe¢ cient estimates of the bivariate probit (BVP) system. Marginal e¤ects corresponding to these estimates appear in Table 5 (see the Appendix). Alongside the BVP results in columns 1 of Table 2 are (for comparative purposes in column 2) single-equation (Probit) estimates of I [i.e., equation (2) only] without controlling for sample selection.
Regarding general human capital, the estimates of the BVP model presented in the …rst columns of Table 2 show that people with some college education are signi…cantly more likely both to engage Table 1 ). LL is the maximized value of lnL in (4). Estimation method: FIML.
in start-up activities and to do so as a nascent entrepreneur (marginal e¤ects for this variable are 0:04 and 0:14, respectively: see Table 5 The sample selection parameter is negative and highly signi…cant. This means that people who start up new ventures rather than doing wage-and-salary work possess unobserved attributes which also predispose them to try independent starts rather than those undertaken jointly with an employer. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 5. But the sample selection issue is of further interest because were it to be ignored, giving rise to the results in column 2 of Table 2 , the researcher would be misled into making several incorrect inferences about the determinants of nascent intrapreneurship versus entrepreneurship. For instance, it would be wrongly inferred that women are much less likely to be nascent intrapreneurs than men are. In fact, the BVP results show that women are simply less likely to engage in start-up activities of either kind ; once this selection is taken account of, gender di¤erences in NI versus NE are no longer statistically signi…cant. Other misleading inferences would also be made about the e¤ects of age and urban location. For these reasons, it is of practical importance to eschew single-equation estimates, and to estimate the complete sample-selection model (1)-(3).
Among the controls appearing in Table 2 , family structure variables help explain the decision to start a venture. This demonstrates the power of these identifying instruments. Full-time married owner-occupiers are signi…cantly less likely than average to start a new venture of any kind. That might be because such individuals tend to be already established in successful wage-and-salary careers, and to have responsibilities to others in their household which deter them from trying selfemployment. Heads of households and members of large households are signi…cantly more likely to engage in start-up activities, however. The marginal e¤ects for these variables are relatively modest in size though, ranging from 0:01 to 0:06 in absolute value. As has been noted in previous Notes: The control variables appearing in the I equation of Table 2 remain individually and jointly insignificant; they were included in these speci…cations but their coe¢ cients and standard errors are not reported.
Coe¢ cients and standard errors for the No. of Supervisees are multiplied by 100. All speci…cations use weighted data and include macro regional dummies and industry dummies. See notes to Table 2. research, African-Americans are also signi…cantly and substantially more likely to engage in startup activities (Kim et. al. 2006 ) although interestingly they are no more or less likely on average to choose NI over NE start-ups.
Results based on screener and follow-up data
The next set of results tests the remaining hypotheses by adding sequentially further explanatory variables from the Follow-up dataset, Z i . Table 3 presents the parameter estimates. Column 1 of Table 3 further explores Hypothesis 1 by adding three proxies for speci…c human capital, while columns 2 through 4 test Hypotheses 2 through 4 respectively. For brevity, only results from the I equation are presented. Estimates of the S equation are very similar to those of Table 2 and so are omitted; they are available from the author on request.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the three measures of speci…c human capital, based on length of job tenure, holding a managerial position in the current or most recent …rm, and the number of supervisees, are insigni…cant determinants of NI start-ups relative to NE. The marginal e¤ects of these variables are also modest, being 0:03, 0:04 and 0:03, respectively. In contrast, general human capital continues to have strong e¤ects, promoting both start-up propensities and independent start-ups in particular. These …ndings are consistent with Hypothesis 1, and suggest that nascent entrepreneurs rely relatively more on general human capital than nascent intrapreneurs, who can exploit other resources within their employer …rm (see below).
Column 2 of Table 3 adds the percentage of projected Business-to-Business sales. This variable is signi…cantly associated with commercialization of new venture opportunities via NI rather than NE, with a fairly sizeable marginal e¤ect of 0:10. This supports Hypothesis 2, which argued that intrapreneurial start-up e¤orts are more likely than entrepreneurial ones to sell to other businesses, possibly because they can leverage greater resources and legitimacy.
The results in column 3 do not support Hypothesis 3. While log income has a positive e¤ect on NI propensities, it is not statistically signi…cant (and its marginal e¤ect is only 0:02); and household wealth has the opposite (negative) sign and is also statistically insigni…cant (its marginal e¤ects is 0:02). It is noteworthy that previous research reports that income and wealth have little or no explanatory power in predicting which people try to start new ventures (Delmar and Davidsson 2000; Kim et. al. 2006; Parker and Belghitar 2006) . The …ndings in column 3 suggest that engagement in nascent intrapreneurship is not explained either by the strategic use of personal income and wealth to resolve agency problems within the …rm (see the arguments leading up to Hypothesis 3).
Column 4 presents results relating to product uniqueness and competitor information acquisition.
None of these e¤ects are signi…cant (marginal e¤ects for the three variables are 0:05, 0:05 and 0:01, respectively). But these relationships strengthen in statistically more e¢ cient speci…cations of the BVP sample-selection model. For example, it is possible to run stepwise estimation routines using all of the variables in the Screener and Follow-up datasets, for both the I and S decision choices.
Details of this procedure -which is data-rather than theory-driven -together with parameter estimates, can be found in Table 6 located in the second part of the Appendix. It turns out that once insigni…cant covariates are dropped from the speci…cation in Column 4, NI is signi…cantly associated with B2B sales, unique products and acquisition of information about competitors (consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 4). The interaction between unique products and competitor information remains insigni…cant, however. This might suggest that incumbents gather information about competitors as a routine process, not speci…cally in order to reassure senior managers about the value of developing new intrapreneurial ventures (Hypothesis 4).
Results based on more parsimonious speci…cations of the bivariate probit sample selection model (Table 6 in the Appendix) also identify some additional determinants of the NE/NI commercialization mode. According to Table 6 , the middle age groups (ages 25 44 years) are signi…cantly more likely than average to engage in some kind of start-up, whereas the youngest people (under 25 years) as well as older (over 45 years) people in the sample are signi…cantly more likely to be nascent intrapreneurs conditional on engaging in start-up activity at all. This …nding is consistent with previous theorizing in the entrepreneurship literature (Lévesque and Minniti 2006; van Praag and van Ophem 1995) . For example, drawing on van Praag and van Ophem's (1995) distinction between ability and willingness to participate in entrepreneurship, the results might suggest that people who lack the resources (the younger) or the inclination (the older) to engage in independent start-up activities can sometimes be persuaded to do so within a corporate environment.
Several other points are of additional interest. First, NI ‡ourishes more in male-dominated workplaces than more gender-balanced workplaces. It is not clear why this is so, especially as a simple gender dummy is always insigni…cant in the I equation of the BVP model, and as this result is robust to including controls for high-tech and new-tech industries, in which male-dominated workplaces are often found. Second, the lack of signi…cance and hence non-appearance in Table 6 of dummies for high-tech or new-tech products belies the emphasis given in the corporate venturing literature to these types of venture (though see Liao and Welsch 2008 , who observed that hightech and non-high-tech NEs appear to follow a common set of core start-up organizing activities).
It is striking that existing corporations are willing to develop unique new products, but are no more or less willing than independent entrepreneurs to develop high-tech products based on new technologies.
Robustness checks
I conduct six robustness checks below. These are intended to test the sensitivity of the results with respect to: (1) the inclusion of social capital, which might be of greater importance for NE than NI; (2) the use of di¤erent measures of general human capital; (3) the inclusion of occupational dummies, since NI might be di¢ cult or even impossible to pursue in some occupations; (4) controls for low-growth hobby businesses, which are more likely to be relevant for NE than NI; (5) the inclusion of controls for business type; and (6) investigation of the possibility that managers rather than workers decide on NI versus NE outcomes.
Regarding (1), social capital can confer legitimacy upon entrepreneurship; reveal information about opportunities, customers, suppliers and competitors; and facilitate access to resources (Florin et. al. 2003) . Family, friends and the community can all be sources of social capital, which can make NE more attractive or feasible relative to NI (Freeman and Engel 2007) . Based on these arguments, dummy control variables were added which record whether Parents were ever business owners or self-employed (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000) ; whether Friends and Family o¤ered support (Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998) ; and whether the individual's community promotes Entrepreneurial Norms (Giannetti and Simonov 2004) . Column 1 of Table 6 in the Appendix shows that two of these measures of social capital, namely parental self-employment and 'entrepreneurial norms', are signi…cantly associated with NE over NI commercialization. In terms of bearing on NI versus NE outcomes, social capital seems to o¤er a complementary and additional explanation to human capital, since the other results remain robust to the inclusion of these variables.
Turning to robustness check (2), the following two additional general human capital variables were available in the Follow-up: industry experience and the number of previous start-ups undertaken by individuals. It is important to check whether these variables a¤ect the results relating to human capital. However, neither of these variables were statistically signi…cant, having coe¢ cients (standard errors) of 0:16 (0:49) and 0:02 (3:46) respectively.
Regarding (3), data on broad occupational groups were included to deal with the possibility that opportunities vary systematically by occupation. If so, the results might merely re ‡ect di¤erent occupational mixes between NI and NE. Controls for a variety of occupations were included, and some of them turned out to be signi…cant, as can be seen in column 2 of Table 6 in the Appendix.
In particular, blue-collar and service-sector employees are much less likely to engage in any start-up activity than their white-collar and non-service-sector counterparts are. While craft workers are no more or less likely to engage in a start-up than the average, those who do are much more likely to do so via NE than NI. This may not come as a surprise, given that artisans tend to run independent small businesses. Because of numerous missing data about occupations, the sample sizes underlying these estimates are smaller and fewer variables remain statistically signi…cant; but the main results generally continue to hold, apart from weaker e¤ects from human and social capital and unique products. In fact, these results should be treated with particular caution since occupations are partially determined by human capital and so could be endogenous.
Robustness check (4) recognizes that many start-ups are hobby businesses ).
Corporations are invariably uninterested in such businesses, setting a higher priority on innovations which generate growth. It is therefore prudent to check whether the results are sensitive to this An overview of the main …ndings of the article is presented in Table 4 , which summarizes the degree of empirical support for the six principal hypotheses examined in this study.
Implications and Conclusions
This article analyzed a recent sample of PSED II data in an attempt to isolate the factors determining whether new start-up opportunities are commercialized via nascent intrapreneurship or nascent entrepreneurship. The analysis highlighted the importance of dealing with self-selection them. Yet other …ndings emerging from the analysis cast doubt on the notion that managerial direction actually shapes nascent intrapreneurship in practice.
My …ndings carry some additional implications for managers. Although it might not be possible to stop employees in the 25 44 year age range from quitting to exploit their ideas in an independent start-up, it is noteworthy that the youngest and older employees are signi…cantly more likely to engage in nascent intrapreneurship than in nascent entrepreneurship. These employees appear to be the most promising candidates for corporate venturing. And the fact that NI appears to be associated with male-dominated workplaces suggests that some work environments are more conducive to corporate venturing than others -a …nding whose underlying causes are unclear and require clari…cation in future research. But just as some nascent intrapreneurs may respond to stimuli emanating from work environments in their employer …rms, nascent entrepreneurs seem to respond positively to stimuli emanating from other people in their social networks. These include their parents and possibly also in ‡uential entrepreneurial role models in their communities.
The results in this article also raise some questions touching on future theory development in the area of corporate versus independent venturing. An important theoretical question is whether managers can design contracts and work environments to minimize the risk that able employees quit to start their own ventures. Or do entrepreneurs'practices of copying their employer's organizational routines in independent ventures make any such e¤orts fruitless? A related but broader question is whether organizations can strategically groom future intrapreneurs. Another is whether managers can derive a competitive hiring advantage by positioning their organizations strategically as ones which provide supportive environments for corporate venturing. These questions all come down to managers making hard-headed decisions about their employees, work environments and corporate venturing opportunities subject to constraints imposed by the marketplace, internal rigidities and managerial capabilities.
Quite apart from being unable as yet to shed any light on these questions, this study is prone to several important limitations. One of these is the use of crude measures of speci…c human capital. As noted at several junctures throughout this paper, genuinely …rm-speci…c human capital is hard to measure properly; but hopefully future research will be able to provide sharper measures of it. Another limitation of the PSED II is that it is not possible to check whether human capital is endogenous (Parker and van Praag 2006) . The PSED II also lacks information about organizational culture and the ways that it can foster creativity among latent entrepreneurs within an organization's workforce. Menzel et. al. (2007) argue that organizational cultures which reduce internal barriers to change and encourage creativity tend to be best placed to foster intrapreneurship. Whether such cultures are generally desirable or even feasible probably depends on the nature of the particular organization and the phase of the relevant product life cycle.
An additional limitation is that the PSED II lacks data about non-compete agreements, which might restrict opportunities for employees to choose NE over NI. And PSED II lacks data about risk attitudes and cognitive styles of individuals (and managers). Thus if existing …rms provide a 'safe'or forgiving environment within which to try a start-up, by o¤ering high levels of support for employees who lack the con…dence required to undertake independent venturing, then one might expect selection of individuals into NI rather than NE along these lines as well. Although previous research suggests that intrapreneurs and entrepreneurs are rather similar in these respects (Hisrich 1990; Hitt et. al. 2002) , further evidence is warranted in a multivariate sample-selection setting.
As well as addressing these limitations, future research could analyze several other interesting issues which fall outside the scope of the present article. For example, we still lack precise estimates of how many new independent start-ups arise from opportunities which incumbent …rms do not wish to develop, compared with ones they would have liked to develop had the employees who discovered them chosen to remain within the …rm. Another set of questions relates to performance.
It would be interesting to establish which of NI and NE start-up e¤orts reach the market the fastest -and indeed how many of them make it to market at all. The author hopes to address some of these questions as future waves of PSED II data become available.
In summary, the research …ndings in this article suggest that individual, organizational and product characteristics all a¤ect decisions to exploit opportunities via intrapreneurship or entrepreneurship. The primary contribution of the paper was to shed empirical light on the precise role played by these and other determinants of entrepreneurs'mode of commercialization, while taking account of self-selection into any form of entrepreneurial activity in the …rst place. Given the ubiquity of over-optimism among venture founders (Cooper et. al. 1988) , it remains to be seen whether the start-up e¤orts explored in this paper are ultimately worth the investment costs, and whether intrapreneurship enjoys any advantage over entrepreneurship in this respect. Any analysis of these questions will also need to take account of sample selection, so the methods and results presented in this paper hold out the promise of helping to answer these questions as well. 7. Appendix 7.1. Marginal e¤ects corresponding to Table 2   Table 5 (see over) Table 5 Marginal e¤ects corresponding to Notes: Marginal e¤ects are the partial derivatives of E(IjS = 1) with respect to the vector of characteristics.
They are computed at sample means based on all observations. 'Individual e¤ects'are marginal e¤ects for each equation separately; 'Joint e¤ects'are the total over both equations. Standard errors in parentheses.
Stepwise procedure and results
Following Kennedy and Gentle (1981) , the stepwise approach commenced with the speci…cation of Table 2 , and entered sequentially variables with the greatest contribution to the log-likelihood LL.
Variables with p-values of 10% or less were retained and those with the smallest contributions to the log-likelihood and with p-values of more than 10% were removed. The procedure continued until no more variables could be entered or deleted, at which point it terminated. Forward and backward strategies for the stepwise algorithm were also tried, but these led to exactly the same …nal results.
Furthermore, checks were performed to ensure that none of the removed variables from the stepwise procedure were jointly signi…cant with other variables. Columns 1 of Table 6 presents the terminal estimates from the stepwise procedure; columns 2 add occupational dummies (see text). 
